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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter by 
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(g)(Rep. 
Vol. 9 1987), as this action involves child custody, adoption and 
paternity. 
The present action challenges the constitutionality of 
certain of Utah's adoption statutes as applied to the facts of 
this case and requests relief for deprivation of civil rights, 
pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1983, in connection with 
the defendants1 action in taking and retaining custody of the 
plaintiff's infant daughter. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) violate 
the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1 §24 of the Utah 
Constitution as it applies to the facts of this case? 
2. Does that same statute violate the due process provision 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitut ion and Article 1 §7 of the Utah Constitution as it 
applies to the facts of this case? 
3. Does that same statute violate the provisions of 
Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions 
and statutes, which are set forth in their entirety in the appendix 
to this brief, is determinative of the issues presented by this 
appeal: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987); 
2. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-12(Rep.Vol. 9 1987); 
3. Utah Constitution, Art. 1 §24; 
4. Utah Constitution, Art. 1 §7; 
5. Utah Constitution, Art. 1 §11; 
6. United States Constitution, Amend. XIV 
7. United States Constitution, Amend. V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Steven Swayne is seeking a declaratory judgment 
and relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
The District Court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary 
injunction, following an evidentiary hearing, and thereafter 
granted the defendants1 motion for summary judgment on both 
counts of the complaint. 
The following statement of the facts of the case is 
supported by citations to the transcript of the testimony of 
Penny Paxman given at the November 13, 1987 hearing on plaintiff's 
motion for preliminary injunction, as no index of the record on 
appeal has been prepared as of this date. 
The basis of plaintifffs complaint is that the defendants 
are presently in custody of Mr. Swaynefs infant daughter, who 
was born on June 4, 1987. Respondents received custody of the 
plaintiff's daughter from Penny Paxman, the child's mother 
(Tr. at 8). On June 8, 1987, Penny signed a release surrendering 
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the child for adoption and placing her with L.D.S. Social Services. 
Prior to that time, Steven Swayne was unaware of any plan by 
Penny to place the child for adoption or of any obligation on 
his part to file an acknowledgement of paternity and willingness 
to support to preserve his parental rights (Tr. at 10). 
L.D.S. Social Services allowed Penny to retain physical 
custody of the child even after she executed her release of 
rights (Tr. at 15). On June 9th she and the child visited Steven 
at his home. This was the second time Steven had received the 
child into his home (Tr. at 16). He also had been present in the 
delivery room when the child was born and had visited with the 
child every day she was in the hospital, including Saturday, 
June 6. Even before the birth of the child he had acknowledged 
his paternity publicly to members of his family. His family held 
a baby shower for Penny where she received gifts for the child 
(Tr. at 9). 
Steven and Penny were never married. Steven is black and 
Penny is white. Penny's mother arranged for her to meet with 
L.D.S. Social Services on June 8. During that meeting, at which 
both of Penny's parents were present, Penny released the child 
for adoption, in part because her parents had informed her that 
she could have no contact with her family if she kept the baby 
(Tr. at 37). 
On June 9, Penny told Steven she was taking the baby on 
a trip. She then physically released custody of the child 
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to L.D.S. Social Services and left for California. She called 
Steven each day and pretended she had the child with her. On 
Saturday, June 13th, she phoned Steven's family and told them 
the baby was dead. When Steven called her back, she admitted 
her deception and agreed to return to Salt Lake City to help 
him attempt to gain custody of his daughter (Tr. at 16-18). 
On Monday, June 15, Steven filed his acknowledgment 
of paternity, he and Penny filed an affidavit to amend the 
child's birth certificate to add his name as the father and to 
give the child his last name, and they went to L.D.S. Social 
Services to ask for the baby. They were advised that it was 
too late and they would have to seek legal counsel (Tr. at 18-19). 
These facts are set forth in the transcript of Penny 
Paxman!s testimony at the hearing on the motion for 
preliminary injunction. Additionally, a stipulated 
statement of facts is contained in a published opinion of the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah. See 
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F.Supp. 1537 (D.Utah 1987). 
Mr. Swayne originally brought suit in Federal District 
Court on June 29, 1987. The Honorable J. Thomas Greene found 
that the Court had jurisdiction but, at the request of the 
defendants, elected to abstain. His order dismissing that case 
was issued on September 3, 1987. This state court action was 
filed on September 6, 1987. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. As applied to the facts of this case, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-30-4(3)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) operates so as to deny 
plaintiff equal protection of the law in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
1 §24 of the Constitution of Utah. This violation arises from 
the different treatment accorded to mothers and fathers of ill-
egitimate children under the statute, whj^ ch requires the consent 
of the mother before any aoption can occur but does not require 
that of the father. In this case, where the identity and location 
of the father was known, the statute's gender based distinction 
between the father and mother cannot be found to be substantially 
related to the achievement of an important governmental objective 
and, therefore, is violative of equal protection. 
2. As applied to the facts of this case, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-30-4(3)(Rep.Vol.9, 1987) operates so as to deny plaintiff due 
process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1 §7 of the Utah 
Constitution. This result occurs because Mr. Swayne was irre-
buttably presumed, under the terms of the statute, to have 
abandoned his daughter by virtue of his failure to file an 
acknowledgement of paternity prior to the time that she was 
surrendered for adoption by her mother, even though Mr. Swayne 
had in fact not abandoned the child, was unaware of any obligation 
on his part to file the acknowledgement to preserve his parental 
rights and was not informed of any intent on the part of the 
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mother to place the child for adoption. Under the circumstances 
of this case, termination of Mr. Swayne!s parental rights is 
inconsistent with any notion of fundamental fairness and is, 
therefore, violative of due process. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) violates 
the provisions of Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution because 
it denies the plaintiff judicial recourse for vindication of his 
parental rights and does so on the basis of statute of repose 
which barred his claim before he was even aware that his parental 
rights were under attack. Utah's Open Court provision prohibits 
the creation of statutes of repose which operate to extinguish 
claims before they even arise. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-30-4 
(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) IS VIOLATIVE 
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution prohibit enforcement of statutes which treat indi-
viduals who are similarly situated in a different fashion. As 
expressed by the Utah Supreme Court, 
[ajlthough their Language is dissimilar, 
these provisions embody the same general 
principles: persons simiarly situated 
should be treated similarly, and persons 
in different circumstances should not 
be treated as if their circumstance were 
the same. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). 
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As applied to the facts of this case, Utah's adoption 
statute violates this fundamental principle in both of the 
prohibited manners. The statute operates so as to treat two 
similarly situated parents of an illegitimate child in a 
different manner and also treats all fathers of such children as 
though their circumstances were the same, even though they are not. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) provides that 
in all cases the consent of the mother is required prior to any 
adoption of her child (presuming of course the mother is living 
and has not had her parental rights terminated by judicial 
decree). This protection is afforded without regard to: whether 
the child is legitimate; the mother's actual willingness to 
fulfill her parental responsibilities; or the mother's failure to 
file an acknowledgment of her willingness to support the child 
with the registrar of vital statistics. 
The father of an illegitimate child, however, is given 
neither the right nor the opportunity to consent to an adoption 
of his child unless he files an acknowledgment of paternity and 
willingness and intent to support the child with the registrar 
of vital statistics.in the department of health. Under the express 
terms of the statute the parents of an illegitimate child are 
accorded different legal rights solely on the basis of their sex. 
The question therefore arises whether this classification is a 
reasonable exercise of legislative authority designed to further 
a legitimate state interest. As stated by the Court in Malan v. 
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Lewis, supra, 
[w]hether a statute meets equal protection 
standards depends in the first instance 
upon the objectives of the statute and 
whether the classifications established 
provide a reasonable basis for promoting 
those objectives. 
693 P.2d at 670. 
The statutory objectives of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 have 
been previously identified by the Utah Supreme Court. As 
articulated by the Court in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of 
Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the state 
has a strong interest in speedily iden-
tifying those persons who will assume 
the parental role over [illegitimate] 
children, not just to assure immediate 
and continued physical care but also 
to facilitate early and uninterupted 
bonding of the child to its parents. 
The state must therefore have legal 
means to ascertain within a very 
short time of birth whether the 
biological parents (or either or them) 
are going to assert their constitutional 
rights and fulfill their corresponding 
responsibilities, or whether adoptive 
parents must be substituted. 
681 P.2d at 203. 
While there can be little question that: this statement sets 
forth a valid state objective, equal protection requires a 
determination of whether or not the statutory classification 
scheme employed provides a reasonable basis for promoting this 
objective. Although the statute provides a method of identifying 
some fathers who are willing to fulfill their parental respon-
sibilities, it in fact defeats the stated objective by not requiring 
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any mother to take any action to identify herself as a willing 
parent. This case graphically illustrates how the statute can, 
in certain circumstances, frustrate the state's objective. 
Mr. Swayne, who has expressed his willingness to fulfill 
his responsibilities, was not "identified11 as a willing parent 
because the statutory method of identification, filing a notice 
with the registrar of vital statistics, is itself an "unreasonable" 
method of identifying willing fathers. Reason would suggest 
that such fathers can be identified by examining their relationship 
with their child. Ms. Paxman, the child s mother, was inaccurately 
"identified" as a willing parent simply because of her sex. 
Therefore, while the statute automatically gave her the rights 
of a responsible parent, it did so inspite of the fact that she 
was not. 
A statutory provision which operates to differentiate between 
men and women in a manner which takes parental rights away from 
responsible fathers while fully vesting such rights in irres-
ponsible mothers cannot be found to provide a reasonable means 
of speedily identifying willing parents. Accordingly, the 
classification employed violates the principles of equal protection 
in the circumstances of this case. As stated by the Court in 
Malan v. Lewis, supra, 
[i]f the relationship of the class-
ification to the statutory objective 
is unreasonable or fanciful, the 
discrimination is unreasonably. 
693 P.2d at 671. 
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The defendants in this action have not, and cannot, offer 
any explanation of how the gender based discrimination in the 
statute promotes the legitimate state insterest of speedily 
identifying willing parents in the context of the facts of this 
case. There simply is none. 
While it has been asserted that the state has a special 
interest in speedily establishing the intentions of the father 
of an illegitimate child, it canft be denied that it has an equal 
interest in speedily establishing those of the mother. Yet, 
the statute does nothing to facilitate this goal. However, because 
the statute often only comes into play when the mother is 
expressly abdicating her parental responsibilities, the focus 
of judicial analysis is frequently upon the state's interest in 
speedily determining if the child can be made available for 
adoption. This raises the question of how the state may deal with 
the parental rights of a father whose identity and location may 
be unknown. While it must be acknowledged that the state can 
legitimately enact measures designed to require such fathers to 
come forward or suffer termination of their parental rights, the 
state may not use the problems presented by absent fathers 
to discriminate against identified, present and willing fathers 
of illegitimate children. To do so violates the second portion 
of the equal protection guarantee, that "persons in different 
circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances 
were the same.11 Malan v. Lewis, supra at 669. Accordingly, 
while potential problems associated with the rights of fathers 
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of illegitimate children may make such fathers an appropriate 
class for distinct legislative treatment, the members of that 
class whose circumstances present none of the problems which the 
statute was designed to meet cannot, constitutionally, be treated 
as though they did. M[A] statute fair upon its fact may shown 
to be void and unenforceable as applied." Ellis v. Social Services, 
615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980). In short, a statute designed 
to provide a means for terminating the parental rights of 
unidentified or unwilling fathers should have no application to 
a known and willing father. 
It must be born in mind that it is only a legitimate state 
objective which can justify a legislative classification. There-
fore, the fact that the statute in question functions in a 
manner which facilitates the adoption process, by removing 
potential obstacles in the adoption of illegitimate children by 
strangers, is no defense to an attack on its constitutionality 
because the state has no valid interest in terminating the parental 
rights of a willing and responsible father whose child happens to 
be illegitimate. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
The irrationality of the discrimination employed by our 
statute is graphically demonstrated by reference to the facts of 
this case. On June 8, when the mother, father and infant child 
were all together in the father's apartment, the mother's parental 
rights were fully vested and the fatherfs were not. Had the mother 
left the child with Steven and gone to California he could not have 
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effected a termination of her parental rights by surrendering 
the child to L.D.S. Social Services. However, on the next day, 
when they were again all together at Steven's apartment, the 
mother had already extinguished Steven's rights by signing her 
consent form. Before she left for California, leaving behind 
her natural daughter, Ms. Paxman had been able to terminate 
Steven's rights even though he was willing to stay and care for 
the child. 
In Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, supra, the Court 
suggested there are reasonable bases for the statute's class-
ifications (between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers 
who file and those who do not), yet neither in that opinion nor 
any other has any Court been able to articulate any such basis. 
What must ultimately be recognized is that Utah's adoption law 
attempts to deal with the problems of unknown fathers with far 
too broad of a brush. It accords mothers with too much protection, 
it accords fathers who file their notice with too much protection, 
and it leaves the rights of some fit and willing fathers totally 
at the mercy of the mother. It is improper to vests such power 
in the mother alone. 
The actions of both parents after the 
birth of their child determine their 
ability to accept parental respon-
sibility. An unwed mother may have no 
more desire to conceive or knowledge 
of the conception than the unwed Father. 
Nevertheless she is given a choice to 
keep or relinquish the child because she 
gave birth. Her decision to release 
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the child for adoption should not 
deprive the father of a meaningful 
opportunity to retain and develop 
his relationship. 
In Re Baby Girl M, 688 P.2d 918, 925 (Cal. 1984). 
The simple fact is that under the Utah statutory scheme 
an indifferent and unfit mother has the absolute right to prevent 
the adoption of her child until her parental rights have been 
terminated by judicial decree, while a caring and involved father 
can see his rights totally forfeited by virtue of his failure 
to comply with an unknown filing requirement. There is no rational 
justification for this disparity of treatment between men and 
women and it serves no governmental interest to discriminate 
against interested fathers and in favor of disinterested mothers. 
Such a statutory scheme was condemned by the United 
States Supreme Court in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
In that action the Court struck down a New York statute which 
purported to require an unwed mother to consent to an adoption 
of her child but imposed no such requirement of receiving the 
consent of an unwed father. The Court expressly noted that any 
attempt to justify such a discrimination by virtue of the fact 
that unwed fathers often cannot be located or identified or that 
they often do not accept their parental obligations has to be 
rejected in a case where the father is known and willing to act 
as a father. 
In those cases where the father never 
has come forward to participate in 
the rearing of the child, nothing in 
the Equal Protection Clause precludes 
-13-
the State from withholding from him 
the privilege of vetoing the adoption 
of that child. Indeed, under the statute 
as it now stands the surrogate may 
proceed in the absence of consent 
when the parent whose consent otherwise 
would be required never has come forward 
or has abandoned the child. But in 
cases such as this, where the father 
has established a substantial relationship 
with the child and has admitted his 
paternity, a State should have no 
difficulty in identifying the father 
even of children born out of wedlock. 
Thus, no showing has been made that 
the different treatment afforded un-
married mothers under §111 bears a sub-
stantial relationship in the proclaimed 
interest of the State in promoting the 
adoption of illegitimate children. 
In sum, we believe that §111 is 
another example of "overbroad gen-
eralizations" in gender-based class-
ifications. The effect of New York's 
classification is to discriminate against 
unwed fathers even where their identity 
is known and they have manifested a 
significant paternal interests in the 
child. The facts of this case illustrate 
the harshness of classifying unwed 
fathers as being invariably less 
qualified and entitled than mothers to 
exercise a concerned judgment as to 
the fate of their children. Section 111 
both excludes some loving fathers from 
full participation in the decision whether 
their children will be adopted and, at 
the same time, enables some alienated 
mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal 
rights of fathers. We conclude that this 
undifferentiated distinction between 
unwed mothers and unwed fathers, applicable 
in all circumstances where adoption of a 
child of theirs is at issue, does not 
bear a substantial relationship to the 
State's asserted interests. 
441 U.S. at 392-93. 
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Every argument advanced as a justification for treating 
unwed fathers differently from unwed mothers is premised upon 
the potential differences between how they may deal with the 
child. However, these justifications are entirely absent when 
an unwed father has publicly acknowledged his child and expressed 
the desire to support the child both financially and emotionally. 
When the purported rationale for the differing statutory treatment 
of men and women is absent, the statutory discrimination cannot be 
constitutionally applied. As the Court noted in Lehr v. Robertson, 
463 U.S. 248 (1983), ffthese statutes may not constitutionally be 
applied in that class of cases where the mother and father are 
in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship 
with the child." 463 U.S. at 267. 
In the only challenge to the statute which was predicated 
upon equal protection grounds, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
statute, but did so on the basis of an inherently contradictory 
interpretation of the effect of the adoption by acknowledgment 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-12(Rep.Vol. 9 1987). In 
Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), the 
Court indicated that the situation presented in Caban would not 
occur in Utah. 
The problem present in Caban is 
obviated in this jurisdiction by 
the provisions of U.C.A. §1953, 
78-30-12 . . . where the father 
of an illegitimate child complies 
with the provisions of that statute, 
his rights with respect to the child 
are as though the child were born 
legitimate. There is therefore no 
merit to plaintiff's contention that 
he has been denied equal protection 
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of the laws. 
615 P.2d at 1255. 
While this assertion has the superficial ring of truth, 
it ignores the Court's own holding in that same case. Earlier 
in the opinion the Court stated that 
whenever the natural mother relinquishes 
custody of the child either to an agency 
or to an individual for purposes of 
adoption, in order to protect his rights 
under U.C.A. 1953, 78-30-12, the putative 
father must file a notice of paternity 
with the Bureau. Where he fails timely 
to act, he flshall be barred from there-
after bringing or maintaining any action 
to establish his paternity of the child.ff 
In the instant case, the child's mother 
has relinquished custody of the child 
for the purposes of adoption, and for 
plaintiff to avail himself of the provisions 
relating to "public acknowledgement11 of 
the child, he must show that he has acted 
timely. 
615 P.2d at 1254 (emphasis added). 
The effect of this holding is to render the supposed 
protection offered unwed fathers by §78-30-12 illusory, because 
if the father who has publicly acknowledged the child doesn't 
file the statutory notice timely (before his child is released 
for adoption by the mother) then his parental rights are ex-
tinguished. 
Ellis, therefore, presents an example of the form of 
insoluble dilemma known in the vernacular as a Catch 22. A 
man who claims §78-30-4(3) discriminates against willing fathers 
is told that a separate statute, §78-30-12, protects such fathers. 
However, if he attempts to make recourse to that statutory 
protection he is told he must first have complied with the 
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provisions of the statute of which he originally complained. 
These propositions are mutually inconsistent and, as an explan-
ation of why the statute doesnft unfairly discriminate, non-
sensical . 
For example, in this case Mr. Swayne has publicly ack-
nowledged paternity of the child, received it into his home 
for visits, was present when the child was born, has filed an 
acknowledgement of paternity, has jointly petitioned with the 
mother to have his name added to the birth certificate and to give 
the child his family name, and has paid doctor's expenses 
associated with his daughter!s birth. Under these circumstances 
there is no question but that he has done that which was necessary 
to have legitimated the child by acknowledgment. Slade v. Dennis, 
594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979). In Slade, the Supreme Court recognized 
that adoption by acknowledgement statutes have traditionally been 
interpreted to require only that the father of an illegitimate 
child publicly acknowledge his paternity, receive the child into 
his home (even if for brief visits) and treat the child as one 
would were she his legitimate offspring. In this case there is, 
therefore, no dispute that Steven satisfied these tests. 
Accordingly, under the terms of the language used in Ellis, 
Mhis rights with respect to the child are as though the child 
were born legitimate11. 615 P. 2d at 1255. If this is true, then 
Mr. Swayne is not the father of an "illegitimate child" within 
the meaning of §78-30-4(3)(a), and he need not file in the manner 
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required and within the time set forth in that statute and, 
therefore, as the father of a legitimate child his consent is 
mandatory before an adoption can be had. 
The other holding of Ellis, however, mandates a filing 
before the child of any unwed father is placed or his parental 
rights under §78-30-12 are forfeited. Plaintiff submits that 
on re-examination of this question there can be no doubt that 
the Court would reach a contrary result. 
While the plaintiff believes that Utah's adoption 
statute is facially unconstitutional, it is respectfully submitted 
that as specifically applied to Mr. Swaynefs circumstance, there 
can be no doubt that the statute's gender discrimination did not 
provide a reasonable method to identify his child1s responsible 
parent, and in fact served to prohibit such identification. 
POINT II - AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-30-4(3) (Rep. 
Vol. 9 1987) VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS 
GUARANTEES OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has found the provisions of 
this statute to be facially valid under the Due Process clauses 
of both the Utah and United States Constitutions, it has recognized 
that application of the statute can violate those provisions under 
particular circumstances. See, e.g., Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. 
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); In Re Adoption of Baby Doe, 
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717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986). Indeed, a recent decision of this Court 
demonstrates that application of the statute to a father who has 
promptly asserted his parental rights when given a reasonable 
opportunity to do so would never be consistent with the principles 
of due process. 
In In the Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987), 
this Court held that considerations of due process prohibited 
application of the parental rights "forefeiture" provisions of 
§78-30-4(3)(c)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) to a father who filed his ack-
nowledgement of paternity the very day that he learned the mother 
of his child had petitioned the Court to permit the child to be 
adopted by another man. In affirming the District Court's order 
dismissing the adoption petition, this Court noted that the father 
had failed to file his acknowledgement of paternity within the 
time prescribed by the statute but held that this failure did not 
preclude further analysis of the facts to determine if due process 
required that he be treated as though he had complied. 
[A]lthough we have found that respondent 
failed to timely file, we must also examine 
whether the statute was constitutionally 
applied to respondent. The state's interest, 
as represented in the statute, is to allow 
for early adoption of illegitimate children 
and commencement of the bonding process 
between the child and its new adoptive 
parents. Such interest must be balanced 
against the constitutionally protected right 
of an unwed father to maintain and develop 
a parental relationship. In Utah, the Supreme 
Court has declared that under the Utah Con-
stitution the parental interest is a "fun-
damentalM right to be invaded only to the 
extent necessary to promote a "compelling11 
state interest. 
740 P.2d at 296. 
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After noting the short delay involved in the father's 
filing, the Court concluded that 
[amplication of the statute to invalidate 
respondent's acknowledgement of paternity 
would impermissible violate respondentsfs 
constitutional rights under both the 
Utah and United States Constitutions. 
740 P.2d at 297. 
This holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
position as expressed in In Re Adoption of Baby Doe, 717 P.2d 
686 (Utah 1986), wherein the Court stated that 
where a father does not know of 
the need to protect his rights, 
there is no "reasonable opportunity" 
to assert or protect paternal rights. 
In such a case, the operation of the 
statute fails to achieve the desired 
balance and raises serious due process 
concerns. 
717 P.2d at 691. 
In that case the father filed his acknowledgement of 
paternity two days after the mother surrendered the child for 
adoption, but one day after he learned of the proposed adoption. 
The Court concluded that his filing must be given effect because 
he had shown 
that the termination of the parental 
rights was contrary to basic notions 
of due process, and that he came forward 
within a reasonable time after the 
baby's birth, [such that] he should be 
deemed to have complied with the statute. 
717 P.2d at 691. 
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In this action, Mr. Swayne filed his acknowledgement 
on the first day it was possible to do so after learning that 
his child had been surrendered for adoption by her mother. He 
had received no prior notice of the mother's intent to take 
this action, despite having been with the mother and child each 
day but one of the child's life prior to her release by the 
mother. Under the facts of this case it cannot be said that Mr. 
Swayne was provided a "reasonable opportunity" to assert his 
rights in a manner consistent with the demands of due process. 
Accordingly, the purported waiver of his rights set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3)(c) cannot be constitutionally applied 
to this case and he should be found by this Court to have all the 
rights and duties of a natural father who has acknowledged paternity, 
including the right to custody of his infant daughter. 
The reason that the statute cannot be applied constitut-
ionally in this case is very simple, as the statute does not 
provide an unwed father with adequate protection to insure that 
he has a reasonable opportunity to develop his constitutionally 
protected relationship with his child. This so-called "oppor-
tunity interest" of an unwed father is one expressly recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248 (1983), and one which was recently defined by the 
Georgia Supreme Court in In Re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E. 2d 
459 (Ga.1987). The Georgia Court noted that 
it is an interest which an unwed 
father has a right to pursue through 
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his commitment to becoming a father 
in a true relational sense as well 
as in a biological sense. Absent 
abandonment of his interest, a 
state may not deny a biological 
father a reasonable opportunity to 
establish a relationship with his 
child. 
358 S.E. 2d at 462. 
The Georgia Court also noted that absent a demonstration 
of unfitness, a 
biological father who pursues his 
interest in order to obtain full 
custody of his child must be 
allowed to prevail over strangers 
to the child who seek to adopt. 
358 S.E. 2d at 463. 
The defendants cannot seriously contend that Mr. Swayne 
in fact abandoned his opportunity interest in his baby daughter 
in the four days following her birth because he manifestly did 
not. He visited her daily, both in the hospital and his own 
home. He invited his family to meet and visit with his daughter 
and he openly and publicly acknowledged his paternity. 
There is no question that the natural father of a child has 
a constitutionally protected interest in his parental rights 
relative to his child. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), 
The relationship between parent and 
child is protected by the federal 
and state constitutions. These pro-
tections include the father of an 
illegitimate child. 
681 P.2d at 202 (citations omitted). 
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The Court has held that parental rights are fundamental, 
and as such, can only be terminated to the extent necessary 
to further a compelling state interest. In In Re J.P., 648 
P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), the Court concluded that 
the right of a parent not to be 
deprived of parental rights without 
a showing of unfitness, abandonment 
or substantial neglect is so 
fundamental to our society and so 
basic to our constitutional order 
that it ranks among those rights 
referred to in Article I §25 of the 
Utah Constitution and the Ninth 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution as being retained by 
the people. 
648 P.2d at 1375. 
While the Court has noted that parental rights 
cannot be constitutionally terminated except upon a judicial 
finding of parental unfitness or abandonment, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-30-4(3)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) purports to mandate such a finding 
in all cases where the father of an illegitimate child hasn't 
filed an acknowledgement of paternity before his child is placed 
for adoption. The statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that 
a father who files Muntimelyf? has abandoned his child. This is 
the exact form of constitutional infirmity in a statute which was 
condemned by the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972), where it was held that an Illinois statute which con-
clusively presumed fathers of illegitimate children to be unfit 
parents violated due process. In that case, the Court noted that 
Illinois 
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insists on presuming rather than 
proving Stanley's unfitness solel}^  
because it is more convenient to 
presume than prove. Under the Due 
Process Clause that advantage is 
insufficient to justify refusing 
a father a hearing when the issue 
at stake is the dismemberment of 
his family. 
405 U.S. at 658. 
The Utah statute purports to presume abandonment, 
rather than prove it, by virtue of an ommission in filing a 
document. It does not provide for any examination of the actual 
relationship of the father with the child. This fact is dramati-
cally demonstrated in this action because it is undisputed that 
the plaintiff had no intent to and did not abandon his child. 
His failure to file a document of which he was unaware prior to 
the happening of an event he had no reason to anticipate simply 
cannot be viewed as conclusive evidence of his intent to abandon 
the child. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that parental rights 
may be terminated for abandonment only flwhen the evidence 
is clear and convincing.11 McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P. 2d 
1286 (Utah 1981). Abandonment occurs where 
the parent has either expressed 
an intention, or so conducted himself 
as to clearly indicate an intention, 
to relinquish parental rights and 
reject his parental responsibilities 
to his child. 
628 P.2d at 1288. 
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In In Re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1983), the Court 
defined abandonment as consisting of 
conduct on the part of the parent 
which implies a conscious disregard 
of the obligations owed by a parent 
to the child, leading to the destruction 
of the parent-child relationship. 
664 P.2d at 1159. The Court noted that the proof required to 
demonstrate abandonment was the same in an adoption case as in 
a termination proceeding. In light of these holdings, it is 
remarkable that §78-30-4(3) purports not only to remove any 
burden of proving abandonment but to affirmatively preclude all 
evidence demonstrating a lack of abandonment. 
The effect of the statute is to deny an unwed father 
substantive due process by denying him any opportunity to contest 
the presumption of abandonment. "Substantive due process concerns 
the content of the rules specifying when a right can be lost or 
impaired." Wells, supra, at 204. 
While much of the litigation surrounding §78-30-4(3) 
has focused on the lack of notice accorded unwed fathers, that 
deficiency is of no constitutional significance under Utah's 
statutory scheme for two reasons. First, even if the statute 
provided for notice of the adoption to be given to all fathers 
and allowed them a hearing, the scope of such hearing would be 
limited to determining whether or not he filed a timely ack-
nowledgement. This is a finding that already occurs even in his 
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absence and his presence would not materially assist in making 
that determination. 
Second, there is no question that an absolute right 
to notice of a proceeding wherein parental rights may be term-
inated is not constitutional^ required. If it were, the most 
unfit parents could frustrate all efforts to terminate their 
rights by abandoning their children and keeping their whereabouts 
a secret. Accordingly, §78-30-4 is not facially invalid merely 
because it doesn't require notice to a putative father as a 
condition of adoption. 
The due process deficiency with the statute is that it 
operates to terminate a father's rights as a parent before any 
adjudication of his abandonment occurs and precludes him from 
ever contesting the "finding" of abandonment. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Stanley, a irrebuttable 
presumption of this nature violates due process if the fact 
presumed is not the necessary result of the fact determined. 
In Stanley, the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois statute 
which purported to equate a father's status as unmarried with 
the fact of unfitness. 
It may be, as the State insists, that 
most unmarried fathers are unsuitable 
and neglectful parents. It may also be 
that Stanley is such a parent and that his 
children should be placed in other hands. 
But all unmarried fathers are not in this 
category; some are wholly suited to have 
custody of their children. This much the 
State readily concedes, and nothing in 
this record indicates that Stanley is 
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or has been a neglectful father who has not 
cared for his children. Given the oppor-
tunity to make his case, Stanley may have 
been seen to be deserving of custody of 
his offspring. Had this been so, the 
State's statutory policy would have been 
furthered by leaving custody to him. 
405 U.S. at 654-55. 
The Court expressly rejected the notion that the State's 
asserted need for expeditous determinations regarding the child 
custody could override a parent's constitutionally protected 
interest in relation to his children. 
The establishment of prompt efficacious 
procedures to achieve legitimate state 
ends is a proper state interest worthy 
of cognizance in constitutional adjudi-
cation. But the Constitution recognizes 
higher values than speed and efficiency . . . 
Procedure by presumption is always 
cheaper and easier than individualized 
determination. But when, as here, the 
procedure forecloses the determinative 
issues of competence and care, when it 
explicitly disdains present realities 
in deference to past formalities, it 
needlessly risks running roughshod over 
the important interests of both parent 
and child. It therefore cannot stand. 
405 U.S. at 656-57. 
This holding is equally applicable to the present action 
where the statute irrebuttably presumes abandonment when that 
finding would be impossible to make on the real evidence. 
While it has been repeatedly noted that the State of 
Utah has a strong and legitimate interest in identifying and 
placing for adoption those children who are without parents 
wiling to provide for them, the State has no interest in depriving 
children of their natural father who is willing to fulfill his 
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paternal duties. As expressed by the Court in Stanley, the 
state's legitimate interest can be disserved if a statute 
operates in such a manner as to define certain children as 
needing adoption when they do not. 
[W]e are here not to evaluate the 
legitimacy of state ends, rather, 
to determine whether the means used 
to achieve those ends are constitutionally 
defensible. What is the state interest 
in separating children from fathers 
without a hearing designed to determine 
whether the father is unfit in a 
particular case? We observe that 
the State registers no gain when it 
separates children from the custody 
of fit parents. Indeed, if [the 
unwed father] is a fit father, the 
State spites its own articulated goals 
when it needlessly separates him from 
his family. 
405 U.S. at 652-53. 
The due process violation contained in §78-30-4(3) is 
not its lack of required notice but rather the refusal to allow 
a meaningful hearing to a father who i_s^  aware of the adoption 
proceeding. Utah law recognizes that the right to notice and 
the right to be heard are not co-extensive. For example, in 
adoptive proceedings a natural grandparent has a right to be 
heard even though he has no right to notice of the proceeding. 
See Wilson v. Family Services Div., 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976). 
It is the statute's attempt to preclude a father from 
establishing his willingness to fulfill his parental duties, not 
its failure to inform him that his rights are under attack, which 
violates due process. This is true because a father who has, 
or is attempting to establish, a true parental relationship with 
his child is bound to discover that his parental rights are being 
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questioned or that another man is asserting an entitlement to 
those rights. The issue in this case is, when such a discovery 
is made and the father seeks judicial relief, is it constitutional 
to preclude him from offering evidence that his child is not in 
need of adoption? 
The inherent constitutional defect in Utah's statute 
is that it does not provide adequate protection for this "oppor-
tunityff of a biological father, which can be lost immediately 
upon the birth of the child, not only without notice but without 
any judicial recourse to assert his entitlement and to petition 
for time to take advantage of this valuable opportunity. 
While Lehr v. Robertson, supra, holds that an unwed 
father can lose this opportunity by the passage of a significant 
period of time wherein he doesn't take advantage of his protected 
status, the Court did not hold or suggest that this opportunity 
could be lost in a matter of days, and lost months prior to the time 
when a petition to adopt the child can even be granted. 
It should also be noted that Lehr was a step-parent 
adoption case where the father's rights were terminated only 
because of a finding that the child's best interest would be 
served by allowing her step-father to acquire parental rights. 
It has been suggested that the holding in Lehr in no way 
applies to cases involving adoptions by strangers. 
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The time limitation [in which an 
unmarried father must assert his 
rights] per se applies only when 
another man has independently taken 
on the responsibilities of fatherhood 
for the child and asks the state to 
validate an already existing relationship. 
If the mother of the child consents 
to the child's adoption by strangers, 
the state still is required under 
the principles of Stanley, unaltered 
by the Lehr opinion, to notify and 
allow participation by a natural 
father who, like Lehr, has done 
nothing to evidence officially a 
waiver or loss of his interest in 
the child. Failure to attempt to 
notify a father in this circumstance 
under a scheme like New York's should 
be unconstitutional even after Lehr. 
E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before 
and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State L.Rev. 313, 367 
(1984). 
In short, Lehr is not persuasive authority for upholding 
Utah's unique statutory scheme because it deaLs with a wholly 
different statute which allows adequate protection of an unwed 
father's "opportunity" interest in establishing a parental relation-
ship with his child. Utah's scheme fails to reasonably protect 
this interest and, as such, is violative of the most basic 
notion of fundamental fairness. 
It must be emphasized that the issue in this case is 
whether or not Utah's statute provided Mr. Swayne with adequate 
safeguards for his constitutionally protected "opportunity interest" 
in establishing a true parental relationship with his baby girl. 
This analysis must be made without consideration being given 
to the perceived interests of the proposed adoptive parents, of 
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L.D.S. Social Services, or even of the child herself. As noted 
in Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before 
and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State Law Journal 313, 373 
(1984), where a biological father who asserts his rights promptly 
is seeking to block a proposed adoption by "strangers, the fatherfs 
opportunity to establish a protected relationship must prevail 
in the absence of his unfitness". 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that consideration of a 
child's best interests cannot provide the basis for termination 
of parental rights. In Re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). The 
question presented in this case, as in all cases of termination 
of a parent's rights, should be whether or not Mr. Swaynefs 
actions warrant a finding of unfitness, substantial neglect or 
abandonment. However, because the provisions of §78-30-4(3) 
foreclose actual consideration of this question, the statute burdens 
fundamental constitutional rights without providing any opportunity 
for an unwed father to establish his fitness or rebut the pre-
sumption of abandonment. 
The absurdity of the statute's conclusive presumption of 
abandonment is highlighted by the facts of this case. On June 9, 
1987, when Mr. Swayne was visiting with his daughter in his own 
home he had already been "deemed" to have abandonmed his baby, an 
infant less than a week old with whom he had spent a part of 
every day of her life save one. A statute which can operate 
to create an abandonment where none exists is not consistant with 
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the notions of basic fairness which lie at the heart of the 
concept of due process, and cannot be given effect in the cir-
cumstances present in this action. 
POINT III - UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3)(c)(Rep. 
Vol. 9 1987) VIOLATES Art. 1 § 11 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3)(c)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) provides 
that 
[a]ny father of [an illegitimate] child 
who fails to file and register his notice 
of claim to paternity and his agreement 
to support the child shall be barred from 
thereafter bringing or maintaining any 
action to establish his paternity of the 
child. Such failure shall further con-
stitute an abandonment of any right to 
notice of or to a hearing in any judicial 
proceeding for the adoption of said child, 
and the consent of such father to the 
adoption of such child shall not be 
required. 
This provision purports to divest a natural father 
from making recourse to the courts for vindication of the injury 
done to him arising from the deprivation of his rights as a parent, 
Art. 1 §11 of the Constitution of Utah specifies that 
[a]11 courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in 
his person, property or reputation shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
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That the termination of parental rights carries a stigma 
of unfitness to be a parent, and is therefore an injury to 
reputation protected by this constitutional proscription, is 
manifest. Therefore, Utah's MOpen Courts" provision requires 
that plaintiff be given recourse to the Courts to vindicate this 
injury. The fact that plaintiff's parental rights could have been 
protected by filing an acknowledgement of paternity before any 
dispute arose cannot save the statute from constitutional infirmity. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently noted that a statute cannot 
abrogate a cause of action before it even arises. In Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), the Court struck down 
a statute of repose in products liability cases as violative of 
the Open Courts provision of our Constitution. It rejected the 
argument that a remedy was available Mby due course of lawM where 
such a purported remedy was so limited as to expire before an 
injury occurred. The Court reasoned that it was sophistry to 
suggest that such a provision was the equivalent to a limitation 
statute. 
In short, the constitutional protection 
cannot be evaded by the semantic argument 
that a cause of action is not cut off 
but only defined to exist for a specified 
period of time. 
717 P.2d at 679. 
Plaintiff submits that any statute which purports 
to limit a citizen seeking judicial relief for his injury to 
a period which can expire prior to the date of his injury is 
violative of Art. 1 §11. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3) is 
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such a statute because it bars judicial relief as of the 
very moment a controversy first arises. 
CONCLUSION 
Legislation designed to address the problems associated 
with unidentified or absent fathers of illegitimate children is 
both rational and necessary to an effective adoption scheme. 
However, such legislation cannot treat these problems in a manner 
which permits the fundamental, constitutionally protected interests 
of a known, present and willing father to be lost without any 
opportunity to demonstrate that he is not in the class of fathers 
giving rise to the need for such legislation. Furthermore, 
the legislation may not make unreasonable classifications vesting 
all mothers with full parental rights while conditioning a father's 
rights upon the completion of an act which bears no logical 
relationship to his actual willingness to assume his responsibilities 
as a parent. 
In Mr. Swaynefs case, application of the statute would 
result in the absurd finding that he abandoned his daughter when 
there is no question that he did not, and would allow this result 
to be achieved by virtue of the actions taken by the mother 
of the child, who definitively did abandon all her interest in 
making any other decisions about the child's future. Accordingly, 
this Court should hold that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) are unconstitutional as applied to the 
facts of this case, should order custody of the child to be placed 
with Mr. Swayne and should remand the case for consideration of 
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the appropriate award of attorney's fees pursuant to the 
provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1988. 
DATED this day of May, 1988. 
M. David Eckersley 
Billy L. Walker, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
1. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 
2. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-12(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) 
3. United States Const., Amend. V 
4. United States Const., Amend. XIV, §1 
5. Constitution of Utah, Art. 1 §7 
6. Constitution of Utah, Art. 1 §11 
7. Constitution of Utah, Art. 1 §24 
78-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims. 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent 
having rights in relation to 6aid child, except that consent is not necessary 
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district 
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court 
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or 
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ-
ing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments, 
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title 
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it 
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be 
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control, 
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency 
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption 
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in 
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed 
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that 
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such 
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption. 
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such 
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such par-
ent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive 
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55, 
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same 
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor 
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon 
such parent's attaining the age of majority. 
[3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegiti-
mate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by 
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of 
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The 
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering 
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the depart-
ment and in the office of the county clerk in every county in this state. 
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must 
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or 
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services or prior to the 
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child 
for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall in-
clude his name and address, the name and last known address of the 
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and 
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health shall 
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose. 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of 
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred 
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his pater-
nity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of 
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a 
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the 
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required. 
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if 
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adop-
tion, it shall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a 
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health, 
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate shall state 
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fa-
thers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found 
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question. 
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, 
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his 
family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby 
adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legiti-
mate from the time of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not 
apply to such an adoption. 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1* 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
ART. I, § 7 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. * 
ART. 1, §11 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
^ All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counse? any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
ART. I, § 24 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
